The Daily Star (Lebanon)
March 20, 2003
Mohammad Noureddine
Opinion
 

Transatlantic rivalry has put the Turks in a bind with their allies

Under normal circumstances, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s elevation to the post of prime minister would have been seen as a significant political event in Turkey. After all, the leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) overcame all the barriers and obstacles put in his path since 1997.

But in recent days, Turkey has had more important concerns to contend with. The country has become a stage for an international tug-of-war between Europe (France and Germany) and the United States. Both sides have been competing to win over Turkey.

The problem is that neither side has been trying to persuade Turkey by way of offers and favors, but rather by means of coercion and pressures that have touched upon issues Turkey considers sacrosanct. Turkey has never been subjected to such intense pressures in all its history. Its only consolation is that such intense pressure from different directions proves how important the country’s role is in the future of Iraq and the Middle East. It sometimes seems that the keys to war and peace are in Ankara’s hands rather than in those of Washington and Baghdad! Turkey is confused. It cannot seem to choose between Europe, the US and the Muslim world. In fact, it has never been as confused, despite suffering from an identity crisis since the modern republic was founded back in 1923.

It is certainly in Ankara’s interests for the current state of peace to continue; this would put Turkey in the same camp as France, Germany, Russia and Turkish public opinion. On the other hand, Turkey cannot remain aloof if war breaks out, since that would deprive it of a role in post-war arrangements and marginalize it in the region. Turkey is therefore also part of the pro-war US and British camp.

That is why Turkey is so confused. How can it take part in a war that is not sanctioned by the UN? How can it go to war without coordinating with Washington, risking clashes with US and Iraqi Kurdish forces in northern Iraq? How can it coordinate with the US after the Turkish Parliament rejected a bill calling for just that?

How can the new Erdogan government push the same bill through Parliament when the circumstances that led to its rejection the first time are unchanged (the Turks have still not received “adequate” American guarantees about the future of Iraqi Kurdistan, Mosul, Kirkuk and the Turcomans)?

Many crucial and sensitive questions remain unanswered. In the midst of this confusion and perhaps because of it, Turkey has taken center stage in the current “game of nations.”

Under the pretext that the Parliament agreed last month for the Americans to upgrade military bases in the country, the US has been moving heavy equipment from ships anchored in the Mediterranean off Iskenderun to towns near the Iraqi border.

Southeastern Turkey began to appear like it was under foreign occupation, which prompted Speaker Bulent Arinc to protest.

To reinforce this fait accompli, US President George W. Bush sent Erdogan a letter that was more of an ultimatum than anything else. Bush reminded the Turkish premier of the dangers to US interests of Turkish non-cooperation. He asked that Ankara “at least” allow the military to use Turkish airspace, making the point that Turkey was the only NATO member not to have done that as yet.

America’s impatience to secure overflight rights was stressed by US Ambassador to Turkey Robert Pearson, who said after meeting with Erdogan that Bush wanted Turkish airspace opened “immediately,” a word he repeated four times.

American diplomatic pressure on Turkey has been unrelenting. US diplomats including Pearson have been busy visiting and hosting Turkish MPs around the clock.

Washington has also been pressuring Turkey economically. Moody’s investment services declared that if the Parliament failed to approve a second bill authorizing the deployment of US forces, the promised $30 billion aid package would evaporate and Turkey’s credit rating would be downgraded.

On the other hand, Europe has been exerting pressure on Ankara to dissuade it from taking part in the war. The Europeans know that Turkish non-participation would at least cause Washington to postpone its plans, if not call them off completely. The Europeans have thus been prodding Turkey where it really hurts: on Cyprus, on accession to the EU and on the Kurdish issue.

Cyprus was never a foreign policy issue for the Turks; it has always been an integral part of Turkish national security. The proposals announced by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan last November were mainly seen in Ankara, especially by the National Security Council from the viewpoint of their possible effects on the future of the Turkish Cypriots and on Turkish national security. The Turkish military concluded that Annan’s proposals would undermine the future of the Turkish Cypriots in favor of their Greek compatriots, and would remove Ankara’s role (guaranteed by the 1959 treaty of Zurich) as guardian of the Turkish Cypriot community.

The talks of March 11 thus failed, and Annan announced that they had arrived at a dead end.

There was nothing really surprising about that. What made this occasion particularly ominous was the statement by EU Commissioner for Expansion Gunter Verheugen that if a settlement were not forthcoming by 2004, the Turkish Army on Cyprus would be seen as an occupying force. Needless to say, Ankara can then kiss EU membership goodbye.

To add to the pressure on Ankara, the European Court of Human Rights announced in Strasbourg the very next day (March 12) that the Ankara State Security Court, which convicted PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, “had not been an independent and impartial tribunal.”

Turkey interpreted this ruling as encouraging the Kurds to secede. In order to deprive its own 12 million Turkish Kurds of the opportunity to gain from the ruling, the Turkish Constitutional Court hurriedly took the steps necessary to close down the (Kurdish) People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) and ban its leaders from political activity. Attorney-General Sabih Kanadoglu then initiated proceedings against HADEP’s successor, DEMAP, in what was seen as a direct response to European pressure.

Turkey thus finds itself in an extremely difficult position, between an American rock and a European hard place. Following the arguments raging in Turkey, one would be excused for believing that the Tower of Babel is not in Iraq but in Turkey. It was not therefore strange that forming a new government in which there were only two new ministers should have taken three days, or indeed that Erdogan should have chosen March 23 as a date for a confidence vote in Parliament in his new cabinet, nine whole days after its formation. It is a given that a new bill on US troop deployment (albeit only for using Turkish airspace) could only be submitted to Parliament after a vote of confidence, if at all.

All these delaying tactics were used to give the government, Parliament, and the army more time to decide on the most appropriate way to extricate Turkey from its dilemma.

The Turks realize that if they side with the US that would mean the end of their dream to be part of Europe. If they side with the anti-war camp that would spell disaster where Iraq, the Kurds and the Turkish economy are concerned.

In short, Ankara is in a bind. Which way is it going to jump?