THE NEW YORK TIMES—Magazine, NOVEMBER 9, 1919

M A N D A T E S   OR   W A R?

World Peace Held to be Menaced Unless the United States Assumes

Control of the Sultan’s Former Dominion

B y H E N R Y   M O R G E N T H A U

Ex-Ambassador to Turkey

  I am one of those who believe that the

United States should accept a man-

date for Constantinople and the sev-

eral provinces in Asia Minor which

constitute what is left of the Ottoman

Empire.

   I am aware that this proposition is not

popular with the American people. But

it seems to me to be a matter in which

we do not have much choice. Nations,

like individuals, are constantly subject to

forces which are stronger than their

wills. The responsibilities to which

individuals fall heir, are frequently not

of their own choosing. The great Euro-

pean conflicts in August, 1914, seemed to

be a matter that did not immediately con-

cern us. In two years we learned that it

was very much our affair. The impelling

forces of history drew us in, and led us

to play a decisive part. It we could not

keep out of this struggle, it is illogical to

suppose that we can avoid its conse-

quences.

   One of the most serious of these conse-

quences and the one that perhaps most

threatens the peace of the world is a cha-

otic Turkey. Unless the United States

accepts a Turkish mandate the world will

again lose the opportunity of solving the

problem that has endangered civilization

for  500 years. 

   The United States has invested almost

$40,000,000,000 in a war against militar-

ism and for the establishment of right.

We must invest three or four billions

more in an attempt to place on a perma-

nent foundation the nations to whose res-

cue we came. An essential part of this

program is the expulsion of the Turk

from Europe and the establishment as

going concerns of the nations which have

been so long subject to his tyranny. Un-

less we succeed in doing this we can look

for another Balkan war in a brief period

perhaps five years.

   Another Balkan war will mean another,

European war, another world war. It is

for the United States to decide whether

such a calamity shall visit the world at

an early date. If we assume the man-

date for Constantinople and the Ottoman

Empire probably we can prevent it; if,

as so many Americans insist, we reject

this duty, we shall become responsible

for another world conflagration.

   Perhaps the most ominous phase of

world politics today is that new voices

are interceding in behalf of the Sultan

and his distracted domain. The Govern-

ment at Constantinople is making one

last despairing attempt to save the be-

draggled remnant of its empire. It has

reorganized its Cabinet, putting to the

fore men who are expected to impress

Europe favorably; but it is not punishing

the leaders who sold out to Germany

and murdered not far from a million of

its Christian subjects. The new Sultan

has given interviews to the press, ex-

pressing his horror at the Armenian

massacres, and promising that nothing

like them shall ever occur again. More

ominous than these outgivings is the fact

that certain spokesmen in behalf of the

Turk are making themselves heard in the

allied countries. Again it is being said

that what Turkey needs is not oblitera-

tion as a State, but reform.

   Probably the financial interests which

look upon Turkey as a field for conces-

sions are largely responsible for this

talk; the imperialistic tendencies of cer-

tain European countries are blamable to a

certain extent, for, strange as it may

seem, there are still many people in Eng-

land, France, and Italy who urge that the

Turks, bad as his instincts may be, is bet-

ter than the Oriental peoples whom he

holds in subjection.

   If we listen to these arguments, and

to the fair promises of the Turkish Gov-

ernment, we shall put ourselves into the

position of a society which fails to pro-

tect itself against the habitual criminal.

Every civilized society nowadays sees to

it that constant offenders against de-

cency and law are put where they can

do no harm. Yet the Turk is the habit-

tual criminal of history, the constant of-

fender against the peace and dignity of

the world, and if we permit him to re-

main in Europe, and to retain an uncon-

trolled sovereignty, it is easy to foresee

the time when a regenerated Russia will

again be dependent on him for a commer-

cial outlet, so that the dangerous situa-

tion of the world-order will be

duplicated and perpetuated. We cannot

hope sanely for peace unless America es-

tablishes at Constantinople a centre from

which democratic principles shall radiate

and illuminate that dark region of the

world.

   If we look at the Near Eastern situa-

tion we perceive that Italy and Greece

are reaching out to such distances for

territory and power that both, if their

ambitions are gratified, will find them-

selves not only unable to govern the new

lands they have acquired, but will be

greatly weakened at home through ex-

penditures in the maintenance of troops

and Governments in their colonies. The

danger is not only that the Balkans will

be more Balkanized than ever, but that

Russia, too, will be Balkanized. The only

safety lies in setting up a beneficent in-

fluence through a strong Government in

Constantinople, which would counteract

the intrigues and contentions of embit-

tered rivals. 

   A brief survey of the history of Tur-

key in Europe will suffice to make clear

the danger of accepting in this late day

any promises of reform from that quar-

ter. I have always thought that the

final word on Turkey was spoken by an

American friend of mine who had spent

a large part of his life in the East, and

who on a visit to Berlin, was asked by

Herr von Gwinner, the President of the

Deutsche Bank, to spend an evening with

him to discuss the future of the Sultan’s

empire. When my friend came to keep

this appointment he began this way:

  “You have set aside this whole even-

ing to discuss the Ottoman Empire. We

do not need all that time. I can tell you

the whole story in just four words:

Turkey is not reformable!”

    “You have summed up the whole situa-

tion perfectly,” replied von Gwinner.

   The reason why this conclusion was

was so accurate was that it was based, not

upon theory, but upon experiment. The

history of Turkey for nearly a hundred

years has simply amounted to an at-

tempt to reform her. Every attempt has

ignominiously failed. Up to fifteen years

ago Great Britain’s policy in the Near

East had as its controlling principle the

necessity of maintaining the independence

and integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

The folly of this policy and the miseries

which it has brought to Europe are so

apparent that I propose to discuss the

matter in some detail, particularly as it

is only by studying this attitude of the

past that we can approach the solution

of the Turkish problem of the present.

   From 1853 to 1856 Great Britain and

France fought a terrible, devastating

war, the one purpose of which was to

maintan the independence of Turkey.

At this time the British public had be-

fore them the Turkish problem in almost

the same form as that which it manifests

today. As now, the issue turned upon

whether they should regard this ques-

tion from the standpoint of civilization

and decency, or from the standpoint of

national advantage and political expe-

diency.

   The character of the Turk was the

same in 1853 that it is now; he was just

as incapable politically then as he is to-

day; his attitude toward the Christian

populatoins whom the accident of history

had placed in his power was identically

the same as it is now. These popula-

tions were merely “filthy infidels,” hated

by Allah, having not rights to their own

lives or property, who would be per-

mitted to live only as slaves of the

mighty Mussulman, and who could be

tortured and murdered at will. All Euro-

pean statesmen knew in 1852 that the ul-

timate disappearance of the Ottoman

Empire was inevitable; all understood

that it was only the support of certain

European powers that permitted it to

exist, even temporarily.

   It was about this time that Czar Nich-

olas I. applied to Turkey the name, “sick

man of the East,” which has ever since

been accepted as an accurate description

of its political and social status. The

point which I wish to make here is that

as it was then. The Turk had long since

learned the great resource of Ottoman

statesmanship—the adroit balancing of

one European power against another as

the one security of his own existence.

   Yet, there was then a school of states-

manship, headed by Palmerston, which

declare that the preservation of this

decrepit power was the indispensable

point in British foreign policy. These

men were as realistic in their policies as

Bismarck herself. Outwardly they ex-

pressed their faith in the Turk; they

publicly pictured him as a charming and

chivalrous gentleman; they declared that

the stories of his brutality were fabri-

cations; and they asserted  that once

given an opportunity, the Turkish Em-

pire would regain its splendor and be-

come a headquarters of intelligence and

toleration. Lord Palmerston simply out-

did himself in his adulation of the Turk.

He publicly denounced the Christian pop-

ulations of Turkey; the stories of their

sufferings he declared to be the most ab-

surd nonsense; he warned the British

public against being led astray by cheap

sentimentality in dealing with the Tur-

kish problem.

   To what extent Palmerston and his as-

sociates believed their own statements is

not clear; they were trained in a school

of statesmanship which taught that it

was well to believe what it was conven-

ient to believe. The fact was, of course,

that the British public was under no par-

ticular hallucinations about the Turk.

But its mind was filled with a great ob-

session and a great fear. The thing that

paralyzed its moral sense was the steady

progress of Russia.

   This power, starting as a landlocked

nation, had gradually pushed her way

to the Black Sea. There was something

in her steady progress southward that

seemed almost as inevitable as fate. That

Russia was determined to obtain Con-

stantinople and become heir to the Sul-

tan’s empire was the conviction that ob-

sessed the British mind. Once this hap-

pened, the Palmerston school declared,

the British Empire would come speedily

to an end. It is almost impossible for us

of this generation to conceive the extent

to which this fear of Russia laid hold of

the British mind. It dogged all the

thoughts of British statesmen and Brit-

ish publicists. There appeared to be only

one way of checking Russia and protect-

ing the British fireside—that was to pre-

serve the Turkish Empire. England be-

lieved that, as long as the Sultan ruled

at Constantinople, the Russian could nev-

er occupy that capital and from it men-

ace the British Empire.

   Thus British enthusiasm for Turkey

was merely an expression of hatred and

fear of Russia. It was this that led

British statesmen to disregard the hu-

mane principles involved and adopt the

course that apparently promoted the na-

tional advantage. The English situation

of 1853 presented in particularly acute

form that question which has always

troubled statesmen: Is there any such

thing as principle in the conduct of a

nation, or is a country justified always

in adopting the course that best promotes

its interests or which seems to do so?

As applied to Turkey it was this: Was

it Great Britain’s duty to protect the

Christians against the murderous at-

tacks of the Mohammedans, or should

she shut her eyes to their sufferings so

long as this course proved profitable

politically?

   I should be doing an injustice to Eng-

land did I not point out that the British

public has always been divided on this

issue. One side has always insisted on

regarding the Turkish problem as a mat-

er simply of expediency, while another

has insisted on solving it on the ground

of justice and right. The part of hu-

manity existed in the days of the

Crimean war. Their leaders were Rich-

ard Cobden and John Bright—men who

formed the vanguard in that group of

British statesmen who insisted on re-

garding public questions from other than

materialistic standpoints.

   Cobden and Bright saw in the Otto-

man question, as it presented itself in

1853, not chiefly a problem in the bal-

ance of power, but one that affected the

lives of millions of human beings. It

was not the threatened aggression of

Russia that disturbed them; their eyes

were fixed rather on the Christian pop-

ulations that were being daily tortured

under the Turkish rule. They demanded a

solution of the Eastern question in the

way that would best promote the wel-

fare of the Armenians, Greeks, Syrians,

and Jews, whom the Sultan had mal-

treated for centuries. They cared little

for the future of Constantinople; they

cared much for the future of these per-

secuted peoples. They therefore took

what was, I am sorry to say, the un-

popular side in that day. They opposed

the mad determination of the British

public to go to war for the sake of

maintaining the Turkish Empire.

   The greatest speech John Bright ever

made was against the Crimean war.

“That terrible oppression, that multi-

titudinous crime which we call the Otto-

man Empire,” was his description of

the country which Palmerston so greatly

admired. Richard Cobden had studied

conditions at first, hand and had reached

a conclusion identically the same as that 

of my friend whom I have already quoted

—that is, that Turkey was not reform-

able. He ridiculed the fear that every-

where prevailed against Russia, denied

that Russia’s prosperity as a nation

necessarily endangered Great Britain, de-

clared that the Turkish Empire could not

be maintained, and that, even though it

could be, it was not worth preserving.

   “You must address yourselves,” said

Cobden, “as men of sense and men or

energy to the question— What are you to

do with the Christian population?  For

Mohammedanism cannot be maintained,

and I should be sorry to see this country

fighting for the maintenance of Mohan-

medanism. * * * You may keep Tur-

key on the map of Europe, you may call

the country by the name of Turkey if

you like, but do not think that you can

keep up the Mohammedan rule in the

country.”

   These were about the mightiest voices

in England at that time, but even Cobden

and Bright were wildly abused for main-

taining that the Eastern question was

primarily a problem in ethics. In order

to preserve this hideous anachronism

England fought a bloody and disastrous

war. I presume most Englishmen today

regard the Crimean war as about the

most wicked and futile in their national

existence. When the whole thing was

over, a witty Frenchman summed up the

performance by saying: “If we read the

treaty of peace, there are no visible signs

to show who were the conquerors and

who the vanquished.” There was only

one power which could view the results

with much satisfaction; that was Turkey.

The Treaty of Paris specifically guaran-

teed her independence and integrity. It

shut the Black Sea to naval vessels,

thus protecting Turkey from attack by

Russia. Best of all, it left the Sultan’s

Christian subjects absolutely in his

power.

   The Sultan did, indeed promise re-

forms—but he merely promised them.

Despite experience to the contrary, the

British and French diplomats blandly

accepted this promise as equivalent to

performance. It is painful to look back

to this year 1856; to realize that France

and England, having defeated Russia,

had a free hand to solve the Ottoman

problem, and that they refrained from

doing so. That absurd prepossession that

this Oriental empire must be preserved

in Europe simply as a buffer State

against the progress of Russia entirely

controlled the minds of British statesmen

—and millions of Christian peoples were

left to their fate.

   What that fate was we all know. The

Sultan’s promises to reform, never made

in good faith, were immediately disre-

garded. Pillage, massacre, and list con-

tinued to the chief instruments used

by the Sublime Porte in governing his

subject peoples. Again the Sultan main-

tained his throne by playing off one

European power against another. The

“settlement” of the Eastern problem

which had been provided by the Crimean

war last until 1876.

   These twenty years were not quiet

ones in the Ottoman dominions; they

were a time of constant misery and tor-

ture for the abandoned Christian popu-

lations. Great Britain and France learned

precisely what the “integrity and inde-

pendence of the Ottoman Empire”  meant

in 1876, when stories of the Bulgarian

massacres again reached Europe. Once

more Europe faced this everlasting ques-

tion of the Turk in precisely the same

form as in 1856. Again the British peo-

ple had to decide between expediency and

principle in deciding the future of Tur-

key. Again the British public divided

into two groups. Palmerston was dead,

but his animosity to Russia and his fond-

ness for the Turk had become the inheri-

tance of Disraeli. With this statesman,

as with his predecessor, Turkey was a

nation that must be preserved, whatever

might be the lot of her suffering Chris-

tians. The other part, that played by

Cobden and Bright in 1856, was now

played by Gladstone.

   “The greatest triumph of our time,”

said Gladstone in 1870, “will be the en-

thronement of the idea of public right as

the governing idea of European politics.”

And Gladstone now proposed to apply

this lofty principle to this new Turkish

crisis. Many of us remember the atti-

tude of the Disraeli Government in those

days. We are still proud of the part

played by two Americans, McGahan, a

newspaper correspondent, and Schuyler,

the American Consul at Constantinople,

in bringing the real facts to the at-

tention of the civilized world.

   Until these men published the results

of their investigations the Disraeli Gov-

ernment branded all the reports of Bul-

garian atrocities as lies. “Coffee house

babble” was the term applied by Dis-

raeli to these reports, while Lord Salis-

bury, in a public address, lauded the

personal character of Sultan. But

these two Americans showed that the

Bulgarian reports were not idle gossip.

They furnished Gladstone his material

for his famous Bulgarian pamphlet, in

which he propounded the only solution

of the Turkish problem that should sat-

isfy the conscience of the British people.

His words, uttered in 1876, are just as

timely now as they were then.

   “Let the Turks now carry away their

abuses in the only possible manner,

namely, by carrying away themselves.

Their Zaptiehs and their Mudirs, their

Bimbashis and their Yugbashis, their

Kaimakans and their Pashas, one and

all, bag and baggage, shall, I hope, clear

out from the province they have deso-

lated and profaned.”

   Gladstone’s denunciation stirred the

British conscience to its depths. The

finer side of the British character mani-

fested itself; the public conscience had

made great advances since 1856, and the

masses of the British people began to

see the Ottoman problem in its true light.

Consequently, when Russia intervened in

behalf of the Bulgarians and other per-

secuted peoples, England did not commit

the fearful mistake of 1853—she did not

go to war to prevent the intervention.

British public opinion at first applauded

the Russian armies; when, however, the

Czar’s forces approached Constantinople,

the old dread of Crimean days seized the

British public once more. Again English-

men forgot the miseries of the Christians

and began to see the spectre [sic] of Russia

seated at Constantinople.  Again Great

Britain began to prepare for war; the

British fleet passed the Dardanelles and

anchored off Constantinople. England

again declared that the safety of her em-

pire demanded the preservation of Tur-

key, and gave Russia the option of war

or a congress at which the treaty she

had made with Turkey should be revised.

   Russia accepted the latter alternative,

and the Congress of Berlin was the re-

sult. This Congress could have freed

all the subject peoples and solved the

Eastern question, but again civilized

Europe threw away the opportunity. At

this Congress England, in the person of

Disraeli, became the Sultan’s advocate,

and again the Sultan came out victori-

ous. Certain territories he lost, it is

true, but Constantinople was left in his

hands and a great area of the Balkans

and a larger part of Asia Minor. As

for the Armenians, the Syrians, the

Greeks, and the Macedonians, the world

once more accepted from Turkey prom-

ises of reform. Thus Gladstone and the

most enlightened opinion in England lost

their battle, and British authority again

became the instrument for preserving

that “terrible oppression, that multitu-

dinous crime which we call the Ottoman

Empire.”

   Had it not been for the Congress of

Berlin it is possible that we should

never have had the world war. The

treaty let Austria into Bosnia and

Herzegovina and so laid the basis for

the ultimatum of July 22, 1914. It failed

to settle the fate of Macedonia, and so

made inevitable the Balkans wars. By

leaving Turkey an independent sover-

eignty, with its capital on the Bosporus,

it made possible the intrigues of Ger-

many for a great Orient empire. No

wonder Gladstone denounced it as an

“insane covenant” and “the most de-

plorable chapter in our foreign policy

since the peace of 1815.”

   “The plenipotentiaries,” he said,

“have spoken in the terms of Metternich

rather than those of Canning. * * * It

was their part to take the side of liberty

—      as a matter of fact, they took the side

of servitude.”

   The greatest sufferers, as always, were

the Christian populations. The Sultan

treated his promises of 1878 precisely as

he had treated those of 1856. It was

after the treaty, indeed, that Abdul

Hamid adopted his systematic plan of

solving the Armenian problem by massa-

cring all the Armenians. The condition

of the subject peoples became worse as

years went on, until finally, in 1915, we

had the most terrible persecutions in his-

tory.

   The Russian terror, if it ever was a

terror, has disappeared. England no

longer fears a Russia stationed at Con-

stantinople, and threatening her Indian

Empire. The once mighty giant now lies

a hopelessly crippled invalid, utterly in-

capable of aggressive action against any

nation. What her fate will be no one

knows. What is certain, however, is that

the old Czaristic empire, constantly bent

on military aggression, has disappeared

forever. When we look upon Russia to-

day and then think of the terror which

she inspired in the hearts of the British

statesmen forty and sixty-two years ago

the contrast is almost pitiful and gro-

tesque. The nation that succeeded Russia

as an ambitious heir to the Sultan’s

dominions, Germany, is now almost as

powerless.

   Moreover, the British conscience has

changed since the days of the Crimean

and Russo-Turkish wars. The old-time

attitude, which insisted on regarding

these problems from the standpoint of

fancied national interest, is every day

giving place to a more humanitarian pol-

icy. Glandstone’s idea of “public right

as the governing idea of European poli-

tics” is more and more gaining the

upper hand. The ideals in foreign policy

represented by Cobden and Bright are

the ideals that now control British pub-

lic opinion. There are still plenty of re-

actionaries in England and Europe that

might like to settle the Ottoman problem

in the old discredited way, but they do

not govern British public life at the

present crisis. The England that will

deal with the Ottoman Empire in 1919 is

the England of Lloyd George, not the

England of Palmerston and Disraeli.

   For the first time, therefore, the world

approaches the problem of the Ottoman

Empire, the greatest blight of modern

civilization, with an absolutely free hand.

The decision will inform us, more elo-

quently than any other detail in the set-

tlement, precisely what forces have won

in this war. We shall learn from it

whether we have really entered upon a

new epoch; whether, as we hope, mediae-

val history has ended and modern history

has begun.

   If Constantinople is left to the Turk,

if the Greeks, the Syrians, the Arme-

nians, the Arabs and the Jews are not

freed from the most revolting tyranny

that history has ever known, we shall

understand that the sacrifices of the last

four years have been in vain, and that

the much-discussed new ideas in the gov-

ernment of the world are the merest cant.

Thus the United States has an immediate

interest in the solution of this problem.

The hints reaching this country that an-

other effort may be made to prop up

the Turk are not pleasing to us. We did

not enter this war to set up new balances

of power, to promote the interest of the con-

cessionaires, to make the new partitions of

territory, to satisfy the imperialistic am-

bitions of contending European powers,

but to lend our support to that new in-

ternational conscience that seeks to re-

organize the world on the basis of jus-

tice and popular rights. The settlement

of the Eastern question will teach us to

what extent our efforts have succeeded.

   If this mistake of propping up the Sul-

tan’s empire is not to be made again,

either that empire must be divided among

the great powers—a solution which is not

to be considered for reasons which it is

hardly necessary to explain—or one of

these great powers must undertake its

administration as a mandatary [sic]. The

great powers in question are the United

States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and

Japan. Of these only the first two are

capable of assuming this duty. Lord

Curson has told me personally that for

political and economic reasons Great

Britain cannot assume the Ottoman man-

date. Lloyd George has said essentially

the same thing. And Stephane Lauzanne,

who speaks in a semi-official capacity for

France, said, in an interview Nov. 1 with

a correspondent of the times:

   “In the offer of a mandate to her

America should see more than the selfish

desire of Europe to involve her in Euro-

pean affairs. It is true she fears to

be the centre of intrigues and difficul-

ties. She fears distant complications.

However, the question is nobler and

higher than that. America is an ad-

mirable reservoir of energy. She holds

the secret of that which is best in our

modern life—to build largely and to build

quickly. She has youth; she has power;

she has wealth; she has that which she

calls efficiency. We in Europe are old,

poor, enfeebled, divided. It would be

prodigiously interesting if America, after

she has given us to her power, of her

money and her material, should give us

also an example.

   “And what an example it would be if

America were to accept the mandate for

Constantinople!  Here is a city which

is one of the marvels of Europe and of

the world, which is the jewel of the

Orient, and which after twenty centuries

of European civilization remains the

home of wickedness and corruption.

Every one disputes possession of its hills

and harbors, and no one tries to make

of it a great modern city which, rid of

international intrigues and rid of poli-

tics, would be the shining pole of Europe.

Only America can transform Constan-

tinople; only America can establish her-

self there without suspicion of bad faith

and without jealousy; only America can

civilize the capital of Islam.

   “To do that America has no need of

regiments of soldiers or of cannon. She

has need only of her workers and her

constructors. A Hoover or a Davison

would be enough. And America is full

of Hoovers and Davisons.”

   I recognize the tremendous problems

which confront us in our own country.

Those problems must and will be solved.

But the day is past when the individual

citizen can permit absorption in his per-

sonal affairs to exclude the considera-

tion of the community’s or the nation’s

wellbeing. A new social conscience has

maintained itself. And it is equally true

that the United States, as a member of

the League of Nations, must take an ac-

tive and altruistic interest in world af-

fairs, however pressing our own prob-

lems may seem. The European situation,

indeed, is really a part of them. Our as-

sociates in the war cannot drift into

bankruptcy and despair without involv-

ing the United States in the disaster.

The losses we would suffer in money

would be the least distressing, should the

world fall into the chaos which is threat-

ening. If we cannot solve our own prob-

lems and at the same time help Europe

solve hers we must be impotent indeed.

   So much, then, for the general princi-

ples involved; what are the practical de-

tails of such a mandate? Last May

William Buckler, Professor Philip M.

Brown, and myself joined a memoran-

dum to President Wilson, outlining brief-

ly a proposed system of government for

the Ottoman dominions. This so com-

pletely embodies my ideas that I reprint

it here, with two slight omissions:

   “The government of Asia Minor

should be dealt with under three differ-

ent mandates, (1) for Constantinople

and its zone, (2) for Turkish Anatolia,

(3) for Armenia. The reason for not

uniting these three areas under a single

mandate is that the methods of govern-

ment required in each area are different.

In order, however, to facilitate the polit-

ical and economic development of the

whole country, these three areas should

be placed under one and the same man-

datory power, with a single Governor in

charge of the whole, to unify the sepa-

rate administrations of the three States.

   “Honest and efficient government in

the Constantinople zone and in Armenia

will not solve the problems of Asia Minor

unless the same kind of government is

also provided for the much larger area

lying between Constantinople and Arme-

nia, i.e., Turkish Anatolia. Constanti-

nople and Armenia and mere fringes; the

heart of the problem lies in Anatolia, of 

which the population is 75 per cent. Mos-

lem.

   “The main rules to be followed in

dealing with this central district are:

   “1. That is should not be divided up

among Greeks, French, Italians, &c.

   “2. That the Sultan should, under

proper mandatory control, retain religious

and political sovereignty over the Tur-

kish people in Anatolia, having his resi-

dence at Brusa or Konia, both of which

are ancient historic seats of the Sultan-

ate.

   “3. That no part of Anatolia should be

placed under Greeks, even in the form of

a mandate. The Greeks are entitled by

their numbers to a small area surround-

ing Smyrna. Under no circumstances

should Greece have a mandate over terri-

tory mainly inhabited by Turks.

   “The above solution of the problem of

Asia Minor means refusal to recognize

secret deals such as the Pact of London

and the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and

especially the Italian claims to a large

territory near Adalia. If Greeks and

Italians, with their long-standing an-

tagonism, are introduced into Asia Minor,

the peace will constantly be disturbed by

their rivalry and intrigues. Italy has no

claim to any part of Anatolia, whether

on the basis of population, of commercial

interests, or of historic tradition.

   “No solution of the Asia Minor prob-

lem which ignores the fact that its popu-

lation is 75 per cent. Turkish can be

considered satisfactory or durable. The

only two countries having any prospect

of successfully holding a mandate over

Anatolia are Great Britain and the

United States.

   “The large missionary and educational

interests of the United States in Ana-

tolia must be adequately protected, and

it is illusory to imagine that this can

be done if Anatolia is subjected to Greek,

French, or Italian sovereignty.

   “Only a comprehensive, self-contained

scheme such as that above outlined can

overcome the strong prejudices of the

American people against accepting any

mandate to cure the ills of Turkey and

to deliver her peasantry from their pres-

ent ignorance and impoverishment re-

quires a thorough reconstruction of Tur-

kish institutions, judicial, educational,

economic, financial, and military.

   “This may appeal to the United States

as an opportunity to set a high stand-

ard, by showing that it is the duty of a

great power, in ruling such oppressed

peoples, to lead them toward self-respect-

ing independence as their ultimate goal.”

   The Armenians are wholly unprepared

to govern themselves or to protect them-

selves against their neighbors. Mere

supervision will not be adequate. What

the Armenian State requires is a kind

of receivership, and we should take it

over to trust, to manage it until it is

time to turn it over when it is govern-

mentally solvent and on a going basis.

Anatolia should be under a separate

management and have its own Parlia-

ment; its Executive should be a Deputry

Governor under a Governor General at

Constantinople. The three Governments

should have a common coinage, similar

tariff requirement, and unified railroad

systems; and in other respects should be

federated somewhat as States in this

country are.

   The commercial importance of such an

arrangement is enormous, for Constan-

tinople must continue as Russia’s chief

outlet to the world, and it is the gateway

to the East. The commercial policy

would, or course, be an open-door policy.

All nations would have equality of oppor-

turniy in trade and would be free in re-

gard to colonization. As a matter of

fact, the commercial situation is of little

importance to us. Prior to the war our

foreign trade amounted to only about 6

per cent. of our total trade; and although

it increased during the war to about 11

per cent., it is likely to recede soon to the

neighborhood of 8 per cent. It will con-

sist largely of raw materials, such as

wheat, cotton, copper, and coal, which

other nations must get from us, whether

or no. Foreign trade is a mere incident;

our prosperity is not what we are fight-

ing for.

   It need not require the extension of

large credits from us to put these nat-

tions on a sound footing. They could be

financed by bond issues issued in each

case against the resources of the terri-

tories involved. If the United States

held the mandates, there would be no

difficulty, I apprehend, in floating such

issues. And as for the policing neces-

sary, that need be very small, provided a

man of strong will and quick decision,

fertile in resources and of unshakable

determination, were assigned to the Gov-

ernorship General at Constantinople. The

opportunity would be a great one for an

American completely imbued with our

institutions. The succession of able pro-

Consuls whom we have sent to the Phil-

ippines shows that we shall not lack such

men.

   We shall surrender our mandates over

these three territories when we have fin-

ished our work. We shall not necessa-

rily leave them all at the same time; we

shall turn each one over to its people

when the public opinion of the world, ex-

pressed in the League of Nations, has de-

cided that it is capable of directing its

own affairs. It might be necessary for

us to remain in Constantinople longer

than elsewhere, and there is reason to

suppose that Constantinople will become

the Washington of the Balkans and per-

haps of Asia Minor, the central govern-

ing power of the Balkan confederation.

But if left without the guidance and help

of outside intelligence and capital, those

peoples  will necessarily continue to retro-

grade. They must have security of prop-

erty if they are to have an incentive to

labor. Unless they have that, the blight

 of Souteastern Europe will remain, and

the Turks, originally a marauding band

of conquerors, who have held a precari-

ous and undeserved footing for more

than 500 years on European soil, will con-

tinue to menace its peace and safety. If

ever there was a chance to put them out,

we have that chance now. The United

States is the only Government which can

undertake the purification of the Balkans

without incurring ill-will and jealousy.

We need not indulge in over polite

phrases. This is the only nation which

can accept these mandates and maintain

international good feeling. It is abso-

sutely our fault if the Turk remains in

Europe.

   The difficulties inherent in this situa-

tion can be cured only at the source. The

League of Nations, when it comes into

being, must not operate exclusively

through a central agency at Geneva, be-

cause it cannot learn in that way the real

difficulties and the wants of dependent

peoples. That can be done only in the

directest [sic] way, through representatives on

the spot. The people, moreover, want to

be heard. They are wonderfully relieved

after they have had their say. That fact

has its touch of pathos, perhaps to some

a touch of the ridiculous;  bit of a fac-

tor of the human equasion [sic] which we can-

not afford to ignore.  And if we supply

American tribunals, disinterested and

just, before which these peoples can

state their grievances and their aspira-

tions, we will have taken a long step

toward their pacification and stabiliza-

tion.

                        ###

Typed word for word. (SKK)

(For educational, archival and “fair use” purposes only.)

Please see:

·         The New York Times, Editorial -“The Turkish Mandate” - November 9, 1919

·         The New York Times – Front Page - By Henry Morgenthau, Ex-Ambassador to Turkey –

      “Turk’s Eyes on Europe, Says our Ex-Ambassador” - November 12, 1922 -